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Abstract
The rise of China is shaping developing countries around the world. The infamous SinoAfrican relationship has highlighted the detrimental effects of unconditional Chinese aid
and trade in developing regions. Corrupt countries are now able to access large amounts
of aid with “no-strings attached.” Even more, China’s hunger for natural resources has
caused many African economies to increasingly rely on primary products.

Despite the extensive coverage on Sino-African relations, little light has been shed on the
long-term implications of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin America.
However, as Latin American economies are forced to “deindustrialize” and corrupt
regimes remain intact, it is pertinent to explore the potential consequences of Chinese
unconditional aid and trade in Latin America.

This thesis will compare Sino-African and Sino-Latin American cases in order to
hypothesize about the future long-term implications of Chinese unconditional aid and
trade in Latin America. By examining scholarly works and historical trends, this thesis
will argue that Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin America supports corrupt and
inefficient regimes while also failing to provide long-term growth opportunities.
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Chapter One: Introduction

Since Chinese economic reforms began in 1979, international actors have
watched closely as Chinese influence in developing regions has continued to grow at an
exponential rate. As the “sleeping dragon” awoke at a breathtaking pace, the world
witnessed China’s GDP increase from less than $150 billion in 1979 to $1.65 trillion in
2005.1 With this extreme domestic growth, China is now able to exert influence abroad
through a number of political and economic channels, including its unconditional foreign
aid and its strategic trade relations. Not only is China using this unconditional aid and
trade as a means to increase diplomatic relationships, the emerging international
superpower is also using foreign aid and trade as a means to further its strategic goals in
developing regions.
Considerable research has been conducted regarding Chinese aid and trade in
African countries. More specifically, analysis has been directed towards both the positive
and negative consequences of Chinese unconditional aid to corrupt African nations such
as Sudan and Zimbabwe, among many. However, little consideration has been given to
Chinese aid and trade in Latin America and its underlying long-term implications on the
political, diplomatic, and economic landscapes of the region. With China pledging to
invest $250 billion in Latin American in the next decade, it is pertinent to understand the
potential consequences of such an influx in aid.2 Generally speaking, without sufficient

1

Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell, China and the Developing
World: Beijing's Strategy for the Twenty-first Century (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
2
Katy Watson, “What will China’s investment do for Latin America?” BBC News, July 7, 2015.
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scholarly analysis on the consequences of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin
America, the future of the region is haphazard and unknown.
This paper will seek to give the Sino-Latin American relationship the attention it
rightly deserves. This chapter will initially introduce China’s international relations,
specifically in terms of aid and trade, while also identifying the importance of the SinoLatin American relationship. After providing this general context, this chapter will
conclude by introducing my hypotheses regarding the long-term implications of Chinese
unconditional aid and trade in Latin America.

China’s Relations with the Outside World
In order to contextualize current Sino-Latin American relations, it is important to
first understand the development of China’s foreign relations policy. Given its vision of
itself as the “Middle Kingdom” (Zhong Guo), China did not put significant emphasis on
developing foreign economic relations during the empire’s earlier years.3 Despite this, the
Spanish Crown was able to form regular commercial ties with Asia, specifically through
the Philippines. In the 16th and 17th century, triangular trade between China, the
Philippines, and the Americas was the extent of Chinese involvement with other
international actors.4 After Latin American countries’ independence from the Spanish
crown in the 1820s, their relationships with China lost relevance for a number of
reasons.5 These newly independent countries were neither stable nor large enough for
continued trade. Moreover, the Latin American countries were concerned with
3

Adrian . earn and Le n os Luisl, China Engages Latin America: Tracing the
Trajectory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2011): 6.
4
Ibid., 6.
5
Ibid., 7.
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maintaining sovereignty from other empires, including China.6 Perhaps most importantly,
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) was preoccupied with Chinese expansion within East and
Central Asia rather than internationally.7
With the decline of the Qing Dynasty in the early 1900s, China began
redeveloping relationships with non-Asian countries such as Brazil, Cuba, Mexico,
Panama, and Peru. Its interest in establishing ties outside of its home territory was, in
part, a result of competitive pressure from growing European powers.8 However, shortly
after the last Chinese emperor resigned in 1912, a civil war between the Nationalists and
Communists ensued, leaving little room for any international relation reform.
When the Chinese Communist forces overtook the Nationalists in 1949, Latin
American countries were largely reluctant to form diplomatic ties with China. Many
Latin American countries between the 1950s to the 1970s were anti-Communist and proWashington, with the exception of Cuba.9 After Fidel Castro took power in 1959, Cuba
became the first Latin American country to redevelop formal diplomatic ties with
China.10 Throughout the Cold War, Beijing maintained its ideological stance and
promoted the “formation of Maoist factions in the Communist parties of Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Peru, and others.”11 Contrary to previous years as the “Middle Kingdom,”
China began viewing itself as a “Third World” country with ties to Latin America, among
other developing regions.

6

Ibid.
Ibid.
8
Ibid., 8.
9
Ibid., 8.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
7
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With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, international relationships at large
began forming on an economic basis more so than an ideological basis.12 China
implemented new policies that focused on maximizing profits rather than spreading
Beijing’s philosophies. We will further explore these policies in the following sections of
this chapter.

The Chinese Foreign Aid Model
Due to the interconnectedness of Chinese aid and investment, I will use the term
“aid” to refer to both forms of financing throughout this thesis. Generally speaking,
Chinese foreign aid takes the form of grants, interest-free loans, or concessional loans.
The Export-Import Bank of China provides concessional loans, and the Chinese state
finances grants and interest-free loans.13 Until recently, Chinese foreign aid was not a
highly publicized phenomenon. However, as Chinese aid continues to become more
prevalent in developing regions, more scholars have started analyzing its roots, terms,
and consequences.
Chinese economic aid and technical assistance to other countries started in the
1950s, when the country itself was short of funds.14 The first forms of Chinese foreign
aid were directed towards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and
Vietnam, both of which had friendly ties with China.15 In an interest to strengthen
political and diplomatic ties outside of Asia, China began aiding African countries in

12

Ibid., 10.
China's Foreign Aid. N.p.: n.p., n.d. UNICEF, Apr. 2011. Web. March 2, 2015.
<http://www.unicef.org/eapro/China_White_Paper_on_Foreign_Aid.full_text.pdf>.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
13
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1956. However, it was not until 1964 that the Chinese government formally declared the
“Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries,” which
stressed equality, mutual benefit, and a “no-strings attached” philosophy.16 China’s
opening-up to the global community in 1978 afforded the country new opportunities to
revise and strengthen foreign policy.17 Since then, China has used its unique foreign aid
policies to form relationships with developing regions in Southeast Asia, Africa, and
Latin America.
With its foreign policy based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
Chinese aid stresses the importance of “non-interference in the internal affairs of other
states.”18 As Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai expressed during his 1953 visit to India,
China’s foreign policy focuses on “mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in one another’s internal affairs;
equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”19 Given this foundation, today
China’s foreign aid policy stresses the following ideas:20


Helping recipient countries build on their own self-capacity



Imposing no political conditions and respecting the recipient country’s
right to choose their own model of development



Maintaining a focus on equality and mutual benefit, both economically
and diplomatically


16

Adapting to changing conditions, both domestic and international

Ibid.
Peter . Smith, K tar orisaka, and Sh ji ishijima, East Asia and Latin America:
The Unlikely Alliance (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003): 318.
18
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 84.
19
Smith, East Asia and Latin America: The Unlikely Alliance, 312.
20
China’s Foreign Aid, 3.
17
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As a country with a one-party system, China is notably less concerned with
promoting democracy and human rights in comparison to the United States or
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).21 Contrary to the
“Washington Consensus” which focuses on trade liberalization, privatization,
deregulation, and fiscal discipline, the “Beijing Consensus” stresses the mutual help
aspect of foreign aid. The non-interference aspect of the “Beijing Consensus” makes
Chinese unconditional especially attractive to countries unable to receive funding from
other organizations. For example, Angola, a state which has been historically
marginalized from international aid due to its high levels of corruption, is a major
recipient of unconditional Chinese aid. In the early 2000s, the Angolan government
rejected a conditional loan from the IMF and accepted an attractive “unconditional” $2
billion loan from China. Upon receiving this “no-strings attached” Chinese aid, the
Angolan government provided China with 40,000 barrels of oil per day.22 The case of
Angola will be further explored in Chapter 3.
Overall, the Chinese foreign aid model is controversial in its intentions and
outcomes. During the London G20 Summit in April 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Brown
formulated a worldwide recovery plan in response to the global financial crisis. This plan
sought to encourage Chinese consumers to spend more in return for the Chinese
government gaining greater influence in the IMF, a plan Beijing enthusiastically
accepted. By the time the G20 Summit had ended, the United States and China were
engaged in a battle to protect their currencies from overvaluation. Within the same week,

21

Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 84.
Yun Sun, "China's Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?" The Brookings Institution. N.p., February 7,
2014. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/02/07-china-aid-to-africa-sun>.
22
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the Chinese government granted Venezuela a $20 billion credit in return for increased oil
exports, and acquired the Brazilian part of a Spanish oil company for $7.1 billion.23
Another important aspect of Chinese foreign aid is that it is “tied.” Chinese aid is
considered “tied aid” because it directly benefits the Chinese economy, both abroad and
at home, by supporting Chinese businesses and workers.24 Take for example the $2.2
billion Chinese-funded dam being built in Ecuador. Instead of hiring local Ecuadorians to
construct the project, China sent over 1,000 Chinese engineers and workers to the Latin
American country.25

Chinese Trade
In addition to Chinese unconditional aid, Chinese trade with developing countries
has also become a highly-contested phenomenon. The share of exports by BRIC
economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) more than doubled between 1996 and 2006,
increasing from 6 percent to 12.4 percent.26 Of this astonishing number, China accounted
for a significant portion. In fact, China’s claim of world exports rose from 2.7 percent to
7.6 percent over the same time period.27 As China’s exports grew, so did its influence
over importing developing regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
This growth is not ending anytime soon; the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
predicts that China’s share of exports will increase to 24 percent by 2050.

23

Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 1.
Yun Sun, “China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?”
25
Clifford Krauss and Keith Bradsher, “China’s Global Ambitions, with Loans and Strings Attached,” The
New York Times, 2015.
26
Shimelse Ali and Bennett Stancil, “Developing Countries Changing the World of Trade,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, November 19, 2009,
http://carnegieendowment.org/ieb/2009/11/19/developing-countries-changing-world-of-trade.
27
Ibid.
24
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Why is trade so important to China, a nation with plentiful resources? The answer
is simple: China’s overusing population. Take for example the fact that China’s forest
area measures approximately 1.2 million square kilometers, yet timber resources are
about 10 billion cubic meters.28 After being an oil exporter until the early 1990s, China
imported 3,384 thousand barrels of oil per day in 2005, accounting for “just under half of
its total daily consumption of 6,988 thousand barrels a day.”29 China has become the
main consumer of raw materials worldwide; according to a 2006 statistic, China buys “40
percent of cement, 31 percent of coal, 30 percent of iron, 27 percent of steel, 25 percent
of aluminum, and 20 percent of copper sold on world markets.”30 From these
percentages, it is apparent that China is constantly experiencing resource strains.
Developing countries fill China’s resource void by acting as convenient exporters of
primary resources such as timber, oil, and other natural resources. In exchange for these
raw materials, China offers consumer goods to these developing regions, such as Latin
America.31
Some scholars argue that this trade trend is pushing Latin America into a
dangerous “raw materials corner.” In other words, Chinese interest in Latin American
raw goods is disallowing Latin American countries to diversify their exporting industries.
It is far more profitable for Latin American countries to simply prepare raw materials to
sell to China rather than support entrepreneurship and diversification. Therefore, SinoLatin American trade may actually cause a detrimental “overdependence on natural

28

Smith, East Asia and Latin America: The Unlikely Alliance, 322.
BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2004-2006.
30
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 10.
31
Ibid., 11.
29
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resource exports” in Latin America. I will analyze this idea further throughout the
remaining chapters.

The Importance of China’s Influence
General literature investigating Chinese aid and trade highlights the importance of
subsequent Chinese influence in recipient developing regions. China’s model of
economic development has afforded the country with immense credibility abroad. Even
more, Chinese international ideology stresses state sovereignty, which is an attractive
message for developing countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.32 China’s
willingness to “engage in development support programs overseas without overt political
and ideological strings has given rise to ‘The Beijing Consensus’” where China “finds
itself now not only in possession of the economic tools to help the world, but the tool of
its example as well.”33 This so-called “Allure of China” and commitment to “noninterference in the internal affairs of other states” has further inspired developing
countries around the world to seek support for China as an alternative to U.S. aid.34,35
Despite the fact that China stresses “the resolve of the Chinese government and the
Chinese people to stick to the road of peaceful development is unshakeable” (PRC
2005b), the greater question, as will be explored in Chapter 5, lies in the long-term
implications of Chinese influence.

32

Scott, The Chinese Century? 83.
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 84.
33
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Relevance of Latin America
After a wave of democratization in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Latin
American countries were increasingly opening their markets to the outside world. Today,
Latin American countries are welcome global market players. With a third of the world’s
fresh water sources and vast amounts of farmable land, Latin America is arguably “the
next global bread basket.”36 As a major supplier of much of the world’s natural resources
and foodstuffs, countries seeking economic opportunities are flocking to Latin America
for investment and trade. Given China’s recent controversial expansion within Latin
America, the region deserves more attention. As New York Times headlines such as
“China’s Ambitious Rail Projects Crash into Harsh Realities in Latin America” fill
newspapers across the world, it is obvious that the Sino-Latin American relationship may
bear important consequences. As Nicaraguan NAFTA negotiator Carlos Zuniga said,
“China is an awakening monster that can eat us.”37 Despite these developments, the topic
of Chinese influence in the Latin American region has been overshadowed by Chinese
actions in African countries.
This thesis will seek to bridge the gap in information that exists in Sino-Latin
American relations by providing analysis on the long-term implications of Chinese
unconditional aid and trade in Latin America. I will hypothesize (1) that Chinese
unconditional aid to Latin America, as an alternative to stringent IMF or U.S. aid, has
supported the existence of inefficient, and oftentimes corrupt, regimes. By comparing
Sino-Latin American relations to Sino-African relations and researching scholarly works,

36

Katy Watson, “What will China’s investment do for Latin America?” BBC News, July 7, 2015.
Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, “China’s Economic Impact in Latin America” Latin American
Research Review 43, no. 1 (2008): 185.
37
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I will further hypothesize (2) that Chinese unconditional aid and trade will not provide
nor incentivize long-term growth in Latin American countries.
In order to test my hypotheses about the long-term implications of Chinese
unconditional aid and trade in Latin America, I will initially provide a general literature
review in which I will highlight common trends. I will next introduce and analyze a
number of Sino-African cases which will highlight the tangible long-term effects of
Chinese unconditional aid and trade. Then, I will present four Sino-Latin American cases
which will highlight the short and medium-term effects of Chinese influence. I will also
discuss the similarities between the Sino-African and Sino-Latin American cases. After
exploring and comparing Sino-African cases and Sino-Latin American cases, I will be
able to accurately test my hypotheses on the implications of Chinese involvement in
Latin America.
On a methodological level, this thesis will use a number of different sources. The
historical context will come primarily from books and journals focusing on either SinoAfrican or Sino-Latin American relations. The specific details of the African and Latin
American cases will also come from a variety of books and online journals. I will also
utilize news sites in order to provide up-to-date information in my final chapter.

18

Chapter Two: Literature Review

In order to hypothesize about the consequences of Chinese aid and trade in Latin
America and its future implications, I call upon a wide array of multidisciplinary
scholarship and research. Although more limited in quantity, various scholars have
published literature, both journalistic and academic, regarding the Sino-Latin American
relationship. This literature generally focuses on the effects of Chinese aid and trade as
well as implications for future developments. Moreover, the resources also introduce
important historical context, diplomatic ties, and analyses on general trends.
Substantial literature has been put forth regarding the Sino-African relationship,
yet little attention has been given to the developing Sino-Latin American relationship.
For this reason, I will use a variety of different sources to support my hypotheses,
including scholarly journals and articles, economic theory, and comparative African case
studies.

Developing the Sino-Latin American Relationship
Early Chinese Empire: As mentioned in Chapter 1, the relationship between
China and Latin America dates back to the early 16th century. Although the Chinese
empire did not focus much on foreign relations during this time, the triangular trade
between China, the Philippines, and the Americas formed what would become a longlasting relationship between China and Latin America.

19

Hearn (2011) and Bingwen, Hongbo, and Yunxia (2012) offer an array of
historical context dating back to the early Chinese empire.38,39 Of notable importance is
China’s relative “hands off” approach during the years of the Qing Dynasty.40 As the
“Middle Kingdom,” China did not feel pressure to expand its power internationally until
much later on.
Lai (2009) brings color to this history by providing insight on the early migration
between Latin America and Asia. During the second half of the nineteenth century, as the
Chinese population skyrocketed and arable land decreased, Chinese citizens began
migrating to the Americas. At first, many of these Chinese migrants rushed to the U.S.
because of the gold rush. Once they recognized the diminishing returns from gold, many
looked for opportunities in Latin America.41 Migration between China and Latin America
continues today. As a form of “tied aid,” China often sends Chinese workers to construct
Chinese-funded dams, stadiums, and other infrastructure. Migration expanded the
relationship between the two developing regions to encompass more than simply
economics.
In the early 1900s, China became increasingly interested in forming more
solidified diplomatic ties outside of its East Asian sphere. In many ways, this desire was a
result of pressure from growing European powers. Despite this, Hearn (2011) explains
that China experienced a civil war between Nationalists and Communists in 1949,
“leaving scant room for new initiatives in the international arena.”42

38

Shaungsheng e, “China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis” (Paths International, 2012).
Hearn, China Engages Latin America.
40
Shaungsheng e, “China-Latin America Relations: Review and Analysis,” 1.
41
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 7.
42
Ibid., 8.
39
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1949 to 1980s: An important pivotal moment in the Sino-Latin American
relationship was the rise of communism in China. As Hearn (2011) describes, the triumph
of the Chinese Communist Party put a strain on Sino-Latin American relations since
many Latin American countries were conservative, anti-Communist, and pro-Washington
at the time. Despite U.S. surveillance on Chinese trade transactions, Sino-Latin American
relations did not cease. After the Cuban revolution in September of 1960, Cuba became
the first Latin American country to develop formal relations with China. U.S.
rapprochement with China in the late 1970s under the Nixon administration pushed
Beijing to forfeit their attempt to spread socialist revolution in Latin America in favor of
forming diplomatic ties with the developing countries.43
Beyond the political landscape, Bingwen, Hongbo, and Yunxia (2012) speak to
the cultural “people-to-people” exchanges between China and Latin America that
occurred during this time period despite the ideological tension. These cultural exchanges
are important to analyze as they deepened the Sino-Latin American relationship and laid
the foundation for Chinese “soft power” in the region.
1980s to Today: Hearn (2011) also analyzes the trajectory of Sino-Latin
American relations after the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet system. By the
1990s, “the emphasis of Sino-Latin American engagement had undergone quite a
remarkable shift from political to economic affairs.”44 During the 1990s China began
undertaking serious efforts to expand its exporting markets. Scholars such as Smith
(2013) and Gallagher (2008) argue that due to a flood of cheap Chinese products, Latin
American economies experienced pressure to downgrade the sophistication of their
43
44

Ibid., 9.
Ibid., 10.
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products and focus solely on producing raw materials.45 This phenomenon will be further
explored later in this chapter and throughout this thesis, as it is still a relevant topic for
Sino-Latin American relations today.
Scholars of contemporary Sino-Latin American relations also focus on the noninterference aspect of what is called the “Beijing Consensus”. In many ways, the “Beijing
Consensus” is a direct competitor with the “Washington Consensus” and similar
conditional aid programs such as those of the IMF and World Bank. In fact, Sun (2014)
argues that the “Beijing Consensus” fills the “empty space [in the ‘Washington
Consensus’] for new models of economic development.”46 The controversial “no-strings
attached” feature of Chinese aid will be important to consider throughout this thesis.

Mutual Attraction
A mutual and non-violent relationship would not be able to form between two
countries if they did not foresee positive outcomes. It is widely accepted that both the
Chinese government and many Latin American governments are motivated to maintain
the Sino-Latin American relationship due to the benefits each country will receive.
Whether this idealistic theory will hold in the future is to be determined, but in the
meantime scholars such as Ellis (2009) have hypothesized about these motivations.
Ellis (2009) defines the factors that fuel the evolving, multidimensional SinoLatin American relationship.47 e argues that China’s interests in Latin America fall into
four distinct categories: (1) acquiring primary products, (2) cultivating markets for
45

Smith, East Asia and Latin America: The Unlikely Alliance, 322.
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 27.
47
R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2009):
9-32.
46
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Chinese exports, (3) gaining international isolation of Taiwan, and (4) securing strategic
alliance with Latin America.48 This thesis will focus primarily on categories 1, 2, and 4;
the consequences of these interests will be further analyzed in terms of its impact on
Sino-Latin American relationship in the next two sections of this chapter.
On the other hand, Ellis (2009) also presents reasons why Latin America is
likewise interested in China. In agreement with many other scholars, Ellis (2009) argues
that Latin America is interested in China for three main reasons: (1) creating export-led
growth, (2) attracting investment in fuel development, and (3) an alternative to U.S.
dominance.49 Although there is less literature regarding Latin America’s interest with
China, Hearn (2011) agrees with the above listed reasons while also emphasizing China’s
attractiveness as an alternative to U.S. influence.50

Chinese Aid to Latin America
Many scholars focus on the impact of Chinese unconditional investment and aid
to Latin America. China has been able to increase its influence dramatically abroad
through its distribution of unconditional aid to a number of third world countries,
including those in Latin America. Although it is difficult to find exact measurements on
Chinese aid, Lum (2009) and Toro (2013) offer substantial facts and data. China directs a
significant portion of their overall foreign aid towards Latin America. Of the Chinese
loans, infrastructure projects, and other aid between 2002 and 2007, 36 percent went to

48

Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, 9-22.
Ibid., 23-28.
50
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 42.
49
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Latin America.51 However, as Lum (2009) notes, the amount of aid China gives Latin
America is substantially less than Chinese aid to Africa. Comprised of many developing
countries, Latin America is a recipient of foreign aid from a number of countries and
institutions. However, some donors such as the U.S. and the World Bank provide loans
with stringent conditions. In an extensive Chinese aid study, Gallagher (2012) found that
although Chinese aid to Latin America is a relatively new phenomenon, by 2010 China
had already loaned more than the World Bank, IDB and US Export-Import Bank
combined.52 Furthermore, although Chinese banks impose no policy conditions on
borrowing governments comparatively, they do oftentimes require equipment purchases
or oil sale agreements.53 This form of “tied aid” helps ensure that the Chinese
government will be able to fulfill its “mutual benefit” principle introduced in Chapter 1.
In fact Gallagher (2012) estimates that two-thirds of all loans to Latin America were
loans-for-oil.54
Chinese aid to Latin America is an attractive alternative for corrupt governments.
As a country characterized by a persistent presence of political and financial corruption in
government, the influx of Chinese aid to Venezuela has filled the vacuum created from a
lack of World Bank loans. Sanderson (2013) explains how in an oil-rich country such as
Venezuela, unconditional aid can increase the risk of political disruption and

51

Thomas Lum, “China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities
in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service ( ovember 25, 2009): 5.
52
Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, and Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town:
Chinese Finance in Latin America,” Inter-American Dialogue (February 2012): 7.
53
Ibid., 1.
54
Ibid., 5.
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corruption.55 In the first nine years of Hugo Chávez’s presidency, an estimated $300
billion of oil income entered the Venezuelan national treasury. Despite this extraordinary
number, Gustavo Coronel, president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida, says the money
was “nowhere to be seen in terms of public works or effective health and education
programs.”56 Ellis (2009) corroborates this argument, stating that Chinese aid and trade
with Venezuela has allowed administrative inefficiency and corruption to persist, even
under the present-day leadership.57
It will be beneficial to refer to cases of Chinese aid to Africa in order to support
my hypotheses regarding the long-term implications of Chinese aid to Latin America. As
mature examples, Sino-African relationships can be used to hypothesize about the
discretion, or lack thereof, that the Chinese government uses when allocating aid.
Brautigam (2009) explains that in many African cases, the danger of this unconditional
aid lies in its long-term consequences on recipient countries. As the Chinese government
continues to blindly distribute aid to developing regions, it subsequently runs the risk of
maintaining and fueling corrupt regimes such as those in Angola or the Democratic
Republic of Congo.

Chinese Trade with Latin America
Another aspect of Chinese influence is its “unconditional” trade. Unlike the U.S.
or European countries, the Chinese would rarely, if ever, impose a trade embargo based
55

Sanderson, Henry, and Forsythe, Michael. Bloomberg , China's Superbank : Debt, Oil and Influence :
How China Development Bank is Rewriting the Rules of Finance (Somerset, NJ, USA: John Wiley &
Sons, 2012): 164.
56
Gustavo Coronel, “The Corruption of Democracy in Venezuela,” CATO Institute, March 2008.
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/corruption-democracy-venezuela.
57
Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, 290.
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on violations of human rights. Instead, as explained earlier, China prides itself on its “nostrings attached” approach.
Chinese trade with Latin America is a differentiating factor between the SinoLatin American relationship and the Sino-African relationship. Specifically, unique to the
Sino-Latin American cases is the abundance of natural resources. Many sources,
including the Economist magazine and even the World Bank, have argued that Latin
American countries “should be rooting for more growth” in China.58 Gallagher (2010)
alludes to this opinion, popular before the financial crisis of 2008. China’s rise would
expectedly increase the demand for Latin American exports and “help pull LAC [Latin
American countries] out of its worst recession in decades.”59 However, more recently
scholars have focused on deeper analysis on the Sino-Latin American trade relationship.
With a more critical eye, scholars such as Devlin (2007), Gallagher (2010), and Hearn
(2012) share data and analyses that support a more precarious view on the Sino-Latin
American trade patterns.
The greater question is whether Sino-Latin American trade is a one-sided gain or
a two-sided mutually beneficial relationship. Devlin (2007) provides statistics that prove
this relationship is mostly one-sided; China exports large amounts to Latin America while
it imports a very small percentage of Latin America goods, other than natural resources.
Devlin (2007) explains that Chile, Argentina, and Mexico were the “only Latin American
countries among China’s top 40 suppliers in 2002, accounting together for just 1.3
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percent of total imports.”60 In fact, Devlin (2007) shows that Latin American growth rates
are not concentrated in sectors that are growing fast globally, but rather the undiversified
exports are focused on Chinese desires.61 earn (2011) shares Devlin’s sentiments. As
Hearn explains, only three Latin American countries had China among their top five
export destinations in 2000, but this number increased to eight in 2009.62 On a larger
scale, the number of countries importing Chinese goods increased from three to thirteen
over the nine year period.63 earn (2011) argues that the “most prominent transformation
in Sino-Latin American trade is the massive growth of China’s exports.” Toro (2013)
agrees that Latin American has become “China’s most dynamic export market with an
annual growth of 31% between 2005 and 2010, versus 16% for the rest of the world.”64
Even further Sino-Latin American trade has been characterized by substantial deficits, a
disappointing phenomenon for many Latin American countries.65
What are the implications of this one-sided relationship? Gallagher (2010) and
Elson (2014) discuss the role of natural resources in the formation and sustainment of
Sino-Latin American relations. Specifically, Gallagher (2010) provides statistics on the
true “winners” of this relationship while also assessing long-term repercussions. For
example, Gallagher finds that 74 percent of all Latin American exports to China were in
primary commodities.66 Many scholars share Gallagher’s opinion that China has played

60

Robert Devlin, Antoni Estevadeordal, and Andrés Rodríguez, Emergence of China: Opportunities and
Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC, USA: Inter-American Development
Bank, 2007): 76.
61
Ibid., 78.
62
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 94.
63
Ibid., 94.
64
Hardy Alfredo Toro. World Turned Upside Down : The Complex Partnership Between China and Latin
America (Singapore, SGP: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2013): 118.
65
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 95.
66
Gallagher, Dragon in the Room: China and the Future of Latin American Industrialization, 12.

27

a notable role in cornering Latin America into a world of primary product dependency.
As Matt Ferchen, resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy,
shared with BBC News in uly 2015, “The imbalanced South American commodity-formanufactures relationship with China has long caused some in the region to worry about
a repeat of historical raw material ‘dependency’ relations.”67 In 2014, for every single
product Mexico exported to China, it imported 11 times that from China.68

Future Implications
Most literature surrounding the Sino-Latin American relationship includes
hypotheses for future relations. These predictions focus mainly on the areas discussed
earlier in this chapter including Sino-Latin American aid and trade.
The Sino-Latin American relationship appears to be based on a mutual
dependency; Latin America needs aid and money for primary products and China needs
to sell its exports and use resources for its manufacturing. However, Ellis (2009) argues
that this reliance on comparative advantage, or specializing in what makes your economy
advantageous, is a dangerous trap for developing countries in Latin America. Latin
American countries certainly find their comparative advantage in producing primary
resources in the short-term; however, as China increases its comparative advantage in
manufacturing, it is inevitable that income for Latin American countries and workers will
be lower in the long-term.69 Although Latin American economies have prospered in the
short-term from Chinese aid and trade, the increased demand is not permanent. Ellis
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(2009) argues that “China’s deliberate effort to move up the value-added chain into
manufacturing and high technology implies that this demand and its benefits may not be
lasting.”70 Even if China continues to buy Latin American resources, demand from China
alone is not enough to sustain entire economies.71
What is the problem with depending solely on income from natural resources? We
can turn to the well-known “resource curse.” Although controversial among economist
and scholars today, Stiglitz (2007) argues that “an obvious fact in most poor, oil-rich
countries is that the income from oil wealth is usually spread very unevenly through the
country.”72 Even for those who do not agree with the idea of the “resource curse,” we can
look to the widely-accepted Solow Growth Model used in economic analyses. The Solow
Growth Model explains that an increase in a country’s savings rate will decrease the
market interest rate and encourage substitution of capital for labor, especially in a
resource-rich country.73 Rather than seeking new varieties of output and new methods of
production, the country will focus solely on producing more of the same good.74 In order
to create an actual shift in the production function and permanently increase long-term
output, a technical change is necessary. This technical change can only arise from
innovation or entrepreneurship, both of which are discouraged when a country is able to
make quick money by exporting primary products. We will refer to the Solow Growth
Model again in Chapter 5.
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In terms of political stability and transparency, the Sino-Latin American
relationship may bring both positive and negative consequences. Ellis (2009) argues that
in corrupt countries such as Venezuela and Ecuador, Chinese aid and trade may help
sustain unethical and inefficient regimes.75 However, he contrasts this negative impact by
calling attention to the cases of Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica in which Chinese aid and
trade actually contributes to the success of effective regimes with a commitment to
democratic processes.76
Although scholars such as Watson (2008) believe that physical distance and
cultural differences may slow the development of strong Sino-Latin American ties, Ellis
(2009) argues that Latin American engagement with China is transforming the region. 77,78
Specific to my hypotheses, Ellis (2009) argues that Chinese trade and aid have supported
corrupt regimes and deterred countries from achieving long-term growth strategies. As
previously mentioned, Ellis (2009) maintains that the policies of the Chavez regime in
Venezuela “…have given rise to a cycle of unpredictability, particularism, and
administrative inefficiency that may ultimately render the country incapable of having a
productive commercial relationship with any party.”79
Scholars have offered a wide array of analysis on both the Sino-African and SinoLatin American relationship. These ideas will be further explored in the subsequent
chapters as we seek to delve deeper into the future implications of Chinese unconditional
aid and trade in Latin America.
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Chapter Three: Historical Context on Sino-African Relations

In order to better understand Chinese motivations for providing aid and trade
while also assessing its effectiveness, this chapter will analyze previous Sino-African aid
and trade relations. Furthermore, these cases will provide additional historical context
and highlight the tangible implications of Chinese aid and trade, which will afford the
opportunity to hypothesize about future implications of the Sino-Latin American
relationship.
In this chapter, I will briefly present three different cases of Chinese involvement
in African countries. The first, Sudan, will demonstrate China’s support of corrupt
regimes and human rights abuse. ext, the case of Angola will highlight China’s use of
“tied aid” to create frivolous and disadvantageous investment projects. Lastly, China’s
involvement in Zambia will highlight the danger of seeking profits at the cost of safety
and cultural concerns.

Why Africa?
Contrary to many Western views of Africa as a “failed continent,” Beijing has
eagerly invested in and traded with many African countries, the majority of which are
resource-rich. China solidified its commitment to maintain relations with Africa with the
establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000.80
Since then, as Brautigam (2009) explains, China has taken a two-pronged approach in its
economic relations with Africa. It has offered resource-backed development loans to
80
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resource-rich countries, and developed trade and economic cooperation zones in other
African nations.81
In many ways, Sino-African relationships are quite similar to many Sino-Latin
American cases. Although the differences between the two regions will be noted in the
remaining chapters, for the purposes of this chapter, a number of similarities should be
emphasized. For one, Africa and Latin America are both developing regions that share a
third-world sentiment with China. Secondly, these developing regions are key recipients
of Chinese “soft power.”82 Lastly, China indiscriminately distributes its aid, therefore
allowing corrupt regimes in both regions to form beneficial relationships with China. As
Robert B. Zoellick stated in his remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, “China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to
consequences and at worst something more ominous.”83

Sudan: Oil at the Cost of Human Rights
Leading up to the Beijing-based Olympics in 2008, China received international
pressure to cut ties with Sudan due to its gross human rights violations in the Southern
and Darfur region.84 Despite this international scrutiny, China continued to give aid and
engage in trade with the controversial country. With nearly 70 percent of Chinese
infrastructure financing concentrated in four African nations including Sudan, it was and
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is apparent that China is committed to maintaining this Sino-Sudanese relationship, even
today.85
The relationship between China and Sudan dates back to 1959, when Sudan
became the fourth African country to recognize the People’s Republic of China.86 Early
in their relationship, Sudan would export cotton to China in return for aid and “attractive
trade agreements.”87 However, this notorious, oil-infused relationship did not truly
progress until the African nation was isolated from the developed world. After U.S.
sanctions against Sudan’s government required U.S. companies to flee the country,
“China’s oil company C PC [the mother company of Petro-China] took over Chevron’s
discarded assets.”88 The Sudanese economy continued to undergo extreme turmoil in the
years to follow, including defunding from the IMF and World Bank. Sudan’s
marginalization from other aid organizations forced the country to rely heavily on China
for aid and trade.
In order to maintain vital relations with China, the Sudanese government turned to
its large primary products supply. As the government’s main source of income, oil is a
driving force of the Sudanese economy. Correspondingly, China is a country with an
extreme thirst for oil. This classic case of supply-and-demand has formed a profitable
Sino-Sudanese relationship. In fact, China is Sudan’s biggest foreign investor, spending
approximately $4 billion per year, according to a 2006 statistic.89 Even more, China is
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responsible for 25 percent of the oil-rich country’s FDI.90 Additionally, China bought 50
percent of Sudan’s oil exports in 2005.91 Due to China’s interest in Sudanese oil, Sudan is
one of the few countries that actually export more to China than it imports.92
The Sino-Sudanese relationship seems to benefit each side in theory; China
secures oil and Sudan receives much-needed funding. However, by providing an
alternative source of income, Chinese unconditional aid undermines attempts by
organizations such as the United Nations to suppress the violence in Darfur. The violence
in Darfur is detrimental to the Sudanese people. According to the United ations, “the
conflict in the Darfur region has killed 300,000 people and displaced 2.5 million people
since 2003.”93 The Janjaweed militias in the Darfur region attack locals, burn down
villages, and terrorize civilians with arson, massacre, and rape. Despite this violence,
China continues to send unconditional aid to the Sudanese government. Moreover, China
fuels the corrupt Sudanese government via oil revenues. Perhaps most notably, a panel of
U experts found that “Chinese weapons were making their way to Darfur.”94 As
Macdonald (2010) explains, “China has been exporting arms and ammunition to Sudan as
well as constructing factories for Sudan to produce its own weapons.”95 Beijing justifies
supplying weapons to unstable regimes, such as Sudan’s, by citing the rights of the
sovereign state and maintaining its “non-interference” stance.96 Even further, the Chinese
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government states that weaponry to these regions works to strengthen and stabilize the
political environment.97 This thought process is inherently flawed as sending arms to
unstable regions only supports pre-existing oppression by supporting the corrupt political
elite.
The case of Chinese aid to Sudan shares a number of similarities and differences
with the Latin American cases. Sudan and many Latin American countries are similar in
their abundance of natural resources. Due to the available resources, China engages in
strategic trade with both Sudan and Latin American countries. Although beneficial for the
developing countries in theory, in reality, this trade tends to benefit corrupt governments
that ignore human rights abuses, among other things. However, it is important to note that
the Sudan case differs from Latin American cases in that Sudan does not import a large
amount of Chinese goods. Rather, Sudan is a primary exporter to China; on the contrary,
as we will find in Chapter 4, Latin American countries tend to also be importers of
Chinese manufactured goods.

Angola: Empty Aid and Extravagant Projects
After the Angolan civil war ended in 2002, the developing country was in dire
need of foreign aid. The Angolan government was close to reaching an agreement with
the IMF for a “few hundred million dollars for the development of the economy” when
Chinese aid emerged as an attractive alternative.98 In contrast to a conditional loan from
the IMF, the Chinese government offered $1 billion, “no-strings attached.”99 Expectedly,
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the Angolan government accepted the unconditional Chinese loan. This was just the
beginning of what would become a long-lasting and controversial relationship.
In line with other Sino-African cases, China is highly interested in Angola’s vast
oil supply. In fact, China’s trade with Angola has surpassed that of the U.S., with a focus
on the oil industry.100 However, unique to the Angolan case, China is not solely interested
in the country’s oil; China also funds and constructs roads and railways across the
country. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the catch with this aid is that it is “tied.” Tied aid
“requires recipients to use goods and services from the donor country.”101 Many of these
Chinese-led projects in Angola employ only Chinese workers and Chinese companies;
therefore, in reality the investments rarely benefit the Angolan economy.102 Data
published by China’s ministry of Commerce revealed that more than 31,000 Chinese
laborers were in Angola by 2009. Even more, the former Chinese ambassador to Angola
estimated that between 60,000 and 70,000 Chinese were in Angola in 2011 in order to
“implement projects financed through the Chinese credit line.”103 Indeed, seventy percent
of oil-backed infrastructure credit offered by China in Angola is reserved for Chinese
companies. Although projects financed by tied aid may seem superficially beneficial,
studies show that “tying aid reduces its effectiveness by some 10 to 30 percent.”104
Chinese tied aid to Angola is leading to the creation of ghost towns throughout the
country. For example, Chinese aid and labor supported a $3.5 billion development
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covering 12,355 acres which was expected to house 500,000 people.105 However, this
satellite city, constructed by Chinese workers and companies, remains untouchable for
many Angolans. Given Angola’s average per capital GDP of $5,144 per year, Angolans
are unable to afford the apartments, which range in price from $120,000 to
$250,000.106,107 It is clear that such extravagant projects benefit the Chinese, not the
Angolan civilians.
In many ways, the Angolan case is very similar to a number of Sino-Latin
American relations. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 2, the use of tied aid is quite
common in many Latin American countries such as Ecuador. In most cases, the general
wastefulness of Chinese investments is quite indisputable. Similar to Angola, many Latin
American countries undertake large Chinese-funded infrastructure projects that are either
never finished or fail altogether. The similarities between Angola and many Latin
American countries, such as Ecuador and Brazil, cannot be ignored.

Zambia: Safety Concerns
Compared to other African countries, Zambia boasts a relatively diversified
economy. Therefore, unlike in the case of Sudan, China invests in “practically all sectors
of the Zambian economy.”108 The case of Zambia is important to include because it acts
as one of the few non-oil driven Chinese investments in Africa.
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China has been a present actor in Zambia since its independence in 1964. Since
then, China has undertaken at least 25 development projects in Zambia, with a majority
concentrated in the manufacturing, construction, and agricultural sectors.109 Each of these
investments, regardless of sector, is tied directly to Chinese companies. In fact, 20
Chinese companies were operating in the Zambian construction sector alone in 2006.110
These investments are massive—in 2007, China gave Zambia $39 million to “reconstruct
transport essential infrastructure.”111
Despite a relatively more diversified market, copper is still a major driver of the
Zambian economy. In fact, Zambia is responsible for nearly 60 percent of African copper
and copper exports make up 40 percent of Zambia’s total exports.112 Conveniently, China
is the world’s largest copper consumer.113 China is eager to enter the Zambian copper
industry. With the privatization of Zambian mines in the 1990s, the NFC Africa (a
subsidiary of a Chinese company) immediately swept in to purchase an 85 percent share
of the Chambishi mine for $20 million and invested another $130 million for its
rehabilitation.114,115 This purchase afforded China with substantial control over a large
portion of the African country’s copper. China quickly implemented new procedures to
ensure more efficient processes. However, in April 2005, an explosion at the Chambishi
mine grounds killed 51 factory workers.116 Following the disaster, China received a
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number of accusations including those regarding safety standards. Even more, many
officials linked the “law safety standards” with fatalities in China’s own mines.117
As tensions between Zambia and China grew, Zambian presidential candidates
began voicing their opinions. Opposition Patriotic Front candidate Michael Sata shared
his suspicious feelings towards China throughout the campaign. Sata expressed, “We
have to be careful because if we leave them [the Chinese] unchecked, we will regret it.
China is sucking from us. We are becoming poorer because they are getting our
wealth.”118 On the other hand, Zambian President at the time, Levy Mwanawasa argued
“The Chinese government has brought a lot of development to this country and these are
the people you are demonstrating against?”119 These conflicting sentiments highlight the
internal tension Zambia experienced after receiving immense amounts of Chinese aid.
Although varied in scale, the feelings of neglect were widely shared among politicians
and civilians.
The Zambian case again shares a number of similarities and differences with
Sino-Latin American relationships. The substantial Chinese interest in natural resource is
a phenomenon many Latin American countries are all too familiar with. The cases of
explosions and disasters at Chinese-owned project sites may be a phenomenon Latin
America will soon be familiar with.
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Overview of Sino-African Trends
These three cases highlight trends such as fueling corruption, empty investment,
and China’s hunger for natural resources. Arguably the most prominent and relevant
trend is China’s desire for primary products. This trend will be particularly useful in
analyzing long-term implications of the Sino-Latin American relationship. Although
there are a number of similarities and differences in African exports and Latin American
exports to China, the overall primary products trend holds for many countries in both
regions. Table 1 below, adopted from Lum (2009), explicitly lists African countries’
main exports to China and evidences the concentration in the primary products sector.

TABLE 1*
AFRICA MAIN EXPORTS TO CHINA
Selected African Countries with Large Reported PRC Aid and Trade, 2002-2007
Main Exports to China

Chinese Financed Projects

Sudan

Oil

Oil refining; infrastructure, hydro
power, humanitarian

Angola

Oil

Infrastructure

Copper

Mining, infrastructure

Oil

Offshore oil development,
infrastructure, medical training

Oil, minerals

Mining, infrastructure

Zambia**
Nigeria
Congo (DRC)

*Adopted from Table 6 in Thomas Lum, “China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment
Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, November 25,
2009, 12.
** Barry Bearak. “Zambia Uneasily Balances Chinese Investment and Workers’ Resentment,” The New
York Times, November 20, 2010.
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The concentration of trade within the natural resources sector is apparent in both
African and Latin American cases. However, Sino-African circumstances vary from
Sino-Latin American relations in terms of type of Chinese involvement. In general, China
focuses on investment in Africa and trade in Latin America. I will further develop this
claim in Chapter 4 where I will present specific cases of both Sino-Latin American aid
and trade. Altogether, although aid is certainly present in Sino-Latin American relations,
the major differentiator between Sino-African and Sino-Latin American relations is the
emphasis on trade with Latin American counterparts.
Despite these differences, using information on the heavily researched and
analyzed topic of Sino-African relations will afford the opportunity to hypothesize about
future effects of Sino-Latin American relations, especially in terms of the long-term
implications of Chinese unconditional aid and trade.
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Chapter Four: Latin American Cases

Given that I have already introduced historical context, general literature, and a
number of Sino-African cases, this section will focus specifically on four Latin American
cases that will each uniquely support my broader thesis. These cases will prove that (1)
Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin American countries is supporting corrupt
and ineffective regimes. Moreover, these cases will further prove (2) that Chinese
unconditional aid and trade will not cause positive long-term changes. In fact, these cases
will illustrate how concentrated trade within the primary products sector and cheap
Chinese manufactured goods actually harm Latin American economies in the long run.
In order to provide context on Sino-Latin American relations, I will focus
specifically on Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. Each case explicitly demonstrates
the consequences of Chinese unconditional aid and trade. First, the case of Mexico
exemplifies the detrimental effects of dumping cheap Chinese exports. Second, the case
of Brazil demonstrates how Chinese interest in natural resources forces developing
countries to focus solely on primary products at the cost of diversifying their economies.
Then, the case of Chile highlights a unique combination of problems posed by Chinese
unconditional trade. China burdens Chile with its cheap manufactured exports and also
forces Chile into a simple economy focused solely on copper. Lastly, the case of
Venezuela highlights how unconditional Chinese aid and trade allows for the
perpetuation of corruption in developing countries.
As earn (2011) explains, “The emergence of China is a momentous
development not simply because of its impact on the world, but because it challenges the
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world to engage China in a constructive dialogue and elicit new forms of mutual respect,
compromise, and cooperation.”120 This chapter will seek to offer specific cases,
anecdotes, and facts that will bring light to the important developments within Sino-Latin
American relations. As China continues to expand its interests in Latin America, it is
crucial to take a critical look at past relations.

Mexico: The Infiltration of Chinese Goods
Mexico is one of four Latin American countries recognized by China as a
strategic partner.121 As one of the most recent strategic partners, Ellis (2009) argues that
China “awarded this honor to Mexico because of [its] importance as a trading partner and
because of the leadership role that is has historically played in the region.”122 Despite this
historic bond, the relationship between China and the developing country divides many
Mexican businesspeople today. One of the most disputed aspects of the Sino-Mexican
case is the influx of cheap Chinese manufactured goods to Mexico. On one hand, China
offers cheap goods; on the other hand, these cheap goods flood Mexican stores and
undermine the domestic economy. Generally speaking, the economic aspect of the SinoMexican relationship has been tense since trade has increasingly favored the Chinese.123
The case of Mexico will highlight this enormous trade imbalance, a phenomenon many
other Latin American countries are all too familiar with.
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It is widely acknowledged that, from the Mexican perspective, the Sino-Mexican
trade relationship has allowed China to boast a significant balance-of-trade surplus.124 In
1995, Chinese imports accounted for 0.9% of total imports to Mexico. By 2005, they
accounted for 3.1% of all Mexican imports.125 According to the Chinese Ministry of
Commerce, in 2007 Mexico exported $3.3 billion worth of goods to China.126 On the
other hand, China exported $11.7 billion in goods to Mexico.127 This gap widened by
2009; according to Mexican figures, Mexico imported $31.9 billion in Chinese goods
while only exporting $2.2 billion to China.128 However, the actual value of this trade
imbalance is highly disputed as Mexican data and Chinese data differ significantly.
Despite these differences in reported numbers, it is undeniable that there is a trade
imbalance in favor of China.
How does China maintain a trade surplus with a resource-rich country such as
Mexico? This imbalance is partially due to the fact that “Mexico consumes, rather than
exports, the vast majority of its primary products.”129 Unlike many African countries,
Mexico is not a large petroleum provider to China; therefore, Mexico has not benefited
greatly from an increase in Chinese consumption of primary products. Although Mexico
produces large quantities of oil, its reserves are generally declining.130 Of these remaining
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reserves, Mexico has an allegiance to a number of pre-existing export commitments,
including the United States.131
Therefore, rather than reaping the benefits of exporting primary products to
China, Mexico has felt the burden of a flood of cheap Chinese manufactured goods. From
2006 to 2007, Chinese exports to Mexico increased by 32.7 percent.132 Chinese goods
have infiltrated the low-end manufactured goods market in Mexico. Even the figurines of
the Virgin of Guadalupe that are sold to tourists in Zocalo, Mexico City are made in
China.133 Beyond this low-end market, Chinese goods also penetrate the high-end
marketplace with cheaper motorcycles, computers, and cars. Furthermore, some scholars
argue that Mexican and Chinese labor-intensive goods are so closely priced that they are
export market competitors.134 In fact, a number of Mexican industries have “demanded
that their government protect them from a flood of low-priced products arriving legally
and illegally from China, and from the loss of employment due to low wages in Chinese
factories.” 135
The infiltration of cheaper Chinese products into the Mexican market has
dramatically affected the lives of Mexican citizens. The attractiveness of cheaper
operations in China has caused Mexican workers to lose their jobs at an exponential rate.
Between October 2000 and December 2002, Mexico lost 270,000 manufacturing jobs.136
In the textile sector, an industry heavily affected by the influx of Chinese goods, between
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2003 and 2006, approximately 250,000 jobs were lost.137 According to a study cited by
Ellis (2009), “40 percent of all the losses in the maquiladora sector during this period
[2003 to 2006] were due to companies moving their operations to Asia [for cheaper
operations].”138 Therefore, not only is the influx of cheap Chinese products harming the
Mexican economy, the attractiveness of the unregulated Chinese market has even swayed
companies to move their production lines and job opportunities, to Asia.
Beyond trading, China has made “tentative” investments in Mexico.139 Between
2000 and 2009, Mexico received $222 billion in foreign direct investment from a number
of developed countries.140 Of this substantial figure, China only contributed a total of
$109.4 million.141 Although only accounting for a small portion of overall aid, these
Chinese investments have led to a number of successful and failed projects.142 The
Chinese-aided failed projects are important to analyze as they all tended to neglect
Mexican regulations. For example, the Xinjianghai fishing company was prevented from
opening a processing plant in San Luis Rio Colorado in the Mexican state Sonora due to
its inability to comply with Mexican regulatory laws. Another example was the 2007
joint venture by Mexican Salinas Group and China’s First Automobile Works. The
Mexican automobile industry “pressured the [Mexican] government to impose stricter
quality-control regulations on Chinese products,” in part due to the competitive tension
mentioned above.143 The estimated cost of the failed project was at least $27.6 million.144
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These failed projects have not positively contributed to the Mexican economy; rather,
they have further infuriated Mexican companies and businesspeople.
In conclusion, the Sino-Mexican relationship highlights the detrimental effects of
imbalanced trade. With a flood of cheap Chinese products, the Mexican economy and
civilians have felt intense consequences. The Mexican government has taken steps to
address growing Chinese influence, including diplomatic trips to China in order to
promote ties. For example, Marcelo Ebrard took a trip to China immediately after being
elected mayor of Mexico City in an attempt to mend ties.145 Although the Sino-Mexican
relationship appears to be growing both diplomatically and economically, it is inevitable
that such a large trade deficit for Mexico negatively affects the country. The
extraordinary number of Chinese imports to Mexico is distorting the domestic economy,
which will have grave long-term effects.

Brazil: The Risk of “Deindustrialization”
Relations between China and Brazil were among the first in Latin America, with
trading relations dating back to the 1800s. The countries formed formal diplomatic ties in
1974 and became official strategic partners in 1993. By 2004, hundreds of positive media
portrayals of the Sino-Brazilian relationship emerged. With a slew of presidential visits
and numerous publicized business deals that year, it was easy to convey an optimistic
story. In 2004, the positive representation of the Sino-Brazilian relationship materialized
once Brazil, among other Latin American countries, signed a bilateral memorandum to
recognize China’s status in the market economy. This occurred shortly after China
144
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accepted its exclusion from the list of market economy nations in order to enter the
World Trade Organization.146 In return for Brazil’s recognition, scholars expected that
China was planning to invest enormous amounts of appreciative aid.147 However, the year
2004 “turned out to be an anomaly.”148 Chinese-funded projects were either stopped or
failed altogether, the Brazilian media aggressively criticized Brazil’s recognition of
China as a market player, and Brazilian businesses worried about Chinese competition in
the domestic economy. Since the commotion of 2004, scholars such as Maciel (2011)
note that Sino-Brazilian “bilateral ties are [still] far from realizing their potential” and
“there are important obstacles and disagreements that have thus far been downplayed or
avoided.”149 Further, he argues that “silences are neglected” including “cancelled visits,
unsuccessful initiatives, missed opportunities, veiled tensions, unspoken disagreements,
and investments that fail to materialize.”150
However, as the region’s largest exporter to China and the region’s second-largest
consumer of Chinese products, China considers Brazil one of its favorite, and oldest,
strategic partners.151 According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Brazil accounted
for over 36 percent of all Latin American exports to China in 2007.152 Similar to many
Sino-African cases, the main Brazilian exports to China were primary products, with soy,
iron, and petroleum accounting for 70 percent of the exports.153 This concentration on
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primary products is atypical for Brazil and has sparked fear of “deindustrialization.”154
This section will seek to uncover negligent acts by China and highlight the signs of
Brazilian “deindustrialization.”
Similar to the Mexican case, Sino-Brazilian trade greatly benefits the Chinese.
Similar to the Mexican case, China is notorious for penetrating the Brazilian market with
cheap manufactured goods.155 Moreover, China’s concentrated interest in primary
products prevents diversification of Brazilian products and markets, thus inhibiting the
domestic Brazilian economy even more.156 China has made obvious its hunger for
primary products; in terms of Brazil, China is mostly interested in iron ore and oil.157
Soon after 2004, Chinese companies acquired a stake in Brazilian miner MMX, bought
an iron-ore mine in Bahia, secured the Itaminas mining company in Minas Gerais, and
installed a steel plant in Rio de Janeiro.158 These Chinese investments provoked the
Brazilian anti-China lobby to denounce the aid as “attempts by the Chinese government
to buy up Brazilian land and resources, distort markets, and destroy Brazilian industry
from within.”159 Since then, prominent figures such as former minister Antonia Delfim
Netto have openly opposed Chinese investment in natural resources.160 This has
translated into legislation to limit foreign purchases of Brazilian land.161

154

Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 246.
Ibid.
156
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 250.
157
Ibid.
158
Ibid.
159
Ibid.
160
Ibid.
161
This has recently been reconsidered as the Brazilian economy has experienced lagging growth in the
past few years. See (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-05/brazil-reconsiders-land-ban-forforeigners-in-commodities-bust) for more information.
155

49

Even beyond trade, China has advanced its own agenda without considering the
effects on Brazilian diplomacy. Take for example the fact that the Brazilian embassy in
Beijing and consular office in Shanghai reportedly “receive little support and attention
from the Foreign Ministry, and both are severely understaffed.”162 On the contrary, the
China has an embassy in Brasilia which employs 40 diplomats in addition to consular
offices in both Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.163 Furthermore, Brazilian national interests
are allegedly blatantly ignored by Chinese officials. A 2009 trip by Brazilian Foreign
Minister Amorim was abruptly cancelled. Shortly after, Brazilian President Lula’s visit
was cut short after neither Hu nor Premier Wen Jiabao would meet with him.
The case of Brazil shares a number of similarities with Sino-Mexican and SinoAfrican relations since China shows a distinct interest in Brazil’s natural resources.
However, Brazil has a pre-existing diversified economy that runs the risk of
“deindustrialization” from an increase in primary products sales to China. Although ties
between the two countries are strong, the lack of communication and coordination among
the two governments highlight the weaknesses within the relationship. China is harming
the Brazilian economy with its concentrated trade in the primary products sector and
China’s neglect of the Brazilian government only deepens the wound.

Chile: The Crisis of Commodity Dependence
Seeing as Chile was the first South American nation to establish formal
diplomatic ties with China in 1971, the Sino-Chilean relationship is one of significant
importance. One central key to the original formation of this relationship was the socialist
162
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orientation of both governments at the time. In light of these political similarities, Chile
and China had a historically positive relationship within the international sphere.164
However, as both countries industrialized throughout the 1990s, their economic
relationship began expanding and complicating, thus causing a number of subsequent
problems.
As Ellis (2009) describes, “Chile is both a leader among nations of the region in
building a commercial relationship with the PRC and an exemplar of challenges that such
a relationship can create.”165 Of the southern region of Latin America, Chile’s
commercial and bureaucratic infrastructure is among the best.166 With convenient access
to Pacific coastlines, Chile boasts some of the most logical ports for Asian goods. In fact,
Chile is one of the only three nations in Latin America that are members of the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.167 Between 1997 and 2006, bilateral trade
between China and Chile expanded by 641 percent.168 Specifically, in 2006, Chilean
exports to China increased by an impressive 140 percent.169 As in most other cases, 98
percent of these exports were primary products.170 Although China’s imports of most
primary products come from a diverse number of African and Latin American countries,
30 percent of China’s entire copper supply comes from Chile.171 Due to China’s
unmatched desire for copper, Chile typically runs a trade surplus with China. In 2009, the
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Chilean trade surplus was $7.49 billion.172 Even in 2013 Chile maintained a trade surplus
of $2.38 billion, despite a decline in copper prices.173 In fact, Chile is the world’s largest
copper exporter and China is the world’s largest importer of the metal, therefore
safeguarding the Chilean surplus.174
Similar to the Mexican case, diplomacy and mutual support are important aspects
of Sino-Chilean relations. In 2001, Chile supported China’s entry into the World Trade
Organization.175 Thereafter in 2004, Chile also recognized China as market economy.176
Later in 2004 during Chinese president Hu Jintao’s visit to Santiago, talks of a free trade
agreement (FTA) began to circulate. The first FTA between China and a Latin America
country was signed in 2005. The Chile-China FTA covered not only trade and
investment, but also education, culture, and environment.177 Hearn (2011) argues that this
was “the most comprehensive agreement China has ever signed.”178 This agreement
seemed to be a step towards long-lasting Sino-Chilean relations.
Despite what may appear to be a jointly beneficial agreement, Chilean officials
are oftentimes critical of the Sino-Chilean relationship. President of the Asociación de
Industrias Metalúrgicas y Metalmecánicas de Chile, Abraham Ducasse, argued for Chile
to maintain tariffs on Chinese goods “until China had shown convincing evidence of
having dismantled its subsidy structure.”179 The Chilean textile sector voiced similar
concerns as the number of employees in the Chilean textile industries decreased from
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240,000 to 30,000 employees from 1994 to 2009 due to an increase in Sino-Chilean
trade.180 However, scholars such as Ellis (2011) argue that the Chilean case is more
encouraging than the Mexican case, explained earlier. Unlike in Mexico, Chilean
companies have been proactive in protecting themselves by “developing aggressive
strategies for commercializing copper in China.”181 Agencies such as Pro-Chile have
conveyed strategic information and analysis to Chilean exporters in order to lower the
risk of Sino-Chilean relations.182
Nonetheless, with falling commodity prices and increasing Chinese imports, Chile
runs the risk of falling into economic traps evident in the Sino-Mexican case.183
Argentine economist Raul Prebisch (1950) disagreed with the optimistic view that Chile
could bypass the trap many Latin American countries fall into. He argued that, over time,
the prices of primary products fall in the international market whereas the prices of
manufactured goods steadily rise.184 In agreement with Prebisch’s analysis, Ellis (2011)
hypothesizes and warns that if Chilean copper continues to devalue, “Chile cannot
compensate for growing Chinese industrial and consumer imports.”185

Venezuela: Fuel for Corruption
The case of Venezuela is vital in highlighting the importance of Chinese aid and
trade as a dangerous and attractive alternative to conditional U.S. and IMF assistance. As
self-proclaimed strategic partners, the Sino-Venezuelan relationship is one of the most
180
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controversial in Latin America. Upon arrival in China in 2008, Venezuelan President
ugo Chávez exclaimed, “Venezuela is no longer the backyard of the United States” and
that it is “more important to be in Beijing than ew York.”186 Chávez was adamantly
opposed to forming relations with the U.S. due to opposing ideologies. Therefore,
scholars claim that he turned to Beijing “as part of his efforts to veer away from his
ideological foes in Washington.”187
Known for his anti-corruption campaign platform, Hugo Chávez ironically
facilitated and perpetuated corruption at all levels of Venezuelan government. During his
campaign and throughout his presidency, Chávez notoriously accepted foreign
contributions and aid.188 Further, under Chávez, the interconnectedness between oil and
politics in Venezuela was unmatched.189 Venezuelan oil income greatly increased during
his regime and the “management of those resources [became] less and less
transparent.”190 Even after the death of Chávez in March of 2013, millions of dollars of
Chinese oil-directed aid continued to fall into corrupt hands under the current Maduro
regime. For example, in late 2013, five Venezuelan government officials were charged
with embezzling approximately $84 million from a Chinese development fund.191 By
January 2015, there were three different official exchange rates in Venezuela. Those who
were “well-connected” were able to send cheap dollars abroad or cash them on the black

186

Christopher Bodeen, “Chavez: Beijing, not U.S., Is Key,” Associated Press, September 24, 2008.
Kejal Vyas, “China’s President Pledges Continued Aid to Venezuela,” The Wall Street Journal, July 21,
2014. http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-president-pledges-continued-aid-to-venezuela-maduro1405974441
188
Gustavo Coronel, “Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in ugo Chavez’s Venezuela,”
CATO Institute Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, November 27, 2006: 9.
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/dpa2.pdf
189
Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 226.
190
Ibid., 5.
191
Vyas, “China’s President Pledges Continued Aid to Venezuela.”
187

54

market.192 Despite the obvious signs of deeply-rooted corruption, China continues to be
one of the largest investors in Venezuela.
In reference to the wide-range of Chinese-funded projects in Venezuela, Chávez
“frequently point[ed] out that Sino-Venezuelan cooperation extends ‘del subsuelo a la
estratosfera’ (from under the ground to the stratosphere).”193 Although China has
generally been cautious about solidifying any nuclear or military alliances with
Venezuela, the Asian superpower has been eager to invest in Venezuela. By 2006,
according to the Chinese embassy in Caracas, “Venezuela was home to the most
important stocks of Chinese investment in Latin America.”194 Strategic investments
became such a critical component of the Sino-Venezuelan relationship that in November
2007, the two countries established the Heavy Strategic Fund of $6 billion.195 Although
China administers the specified funds, Venezuela is ultimately responsible for repaying
the loans. Projects aided by the Heavy Strategic Fund are voted on by a committee in
which votes are proportional to the amount of contributions per country. By April 2009,
the fund had expanded to $16 billion after “an injection of Chinese capital in return for
commitments of Venezuelan oil.”196 Later that year China announced it would provide
Venezuela with an additional $20 billion in aid. Chávez was quick to acknowledge the
“generous conditions of this financing” and contrasted it against the “inflexible
requirements of the International Monetary Fund and Inter-American Development
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Bank.”197 Altogether, China has put about a third of its overseas lending into
Venezuela.198 This aid generally comes with little, if any, restrictions or conditions.
Unlike other Sino-Latin American cases, Venezuela is not notably burdened with
cheap Chinese manufactured goods. As explained earlier, oil continues to be the most
distinguished Chinese interest in the Latin American country. Consequently, Venezuela
exports more than 700,000 barrels of oil a day to China.199 Even more, Venezuelan
officials claim that they “plan to increase shipments to one million barrels a day in the
coming years.”200
Despite the allegations and evidences of corruption in Venezuela, and contrary to
U.S.-Venezuelan relations, “the level of political interaction between China and
Venezuela is significant.”201 In fact, as of 2008, Chávez had visited China five times
during his presidency.202 Even as recently as July 2014, Chinese President Xi Jingping
pledged additional financial support to Venezuela under the present-day Maduro
regime.203 Despite this, these large investments “have done little to turn around
Venezuela’s economic fortunes” and simply broadened China’s oil supply.204 Director of
the Center for International Development at arvard Ricardo ausmann argues that “the
billions of dollars China loans to Venezuela in exchange for oil are a ‘disgrace’ and used
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for corrupt purposes.”205 Therefore, similar to many Sino-African cases, the SinoVenezuelan relationship has supported corrupt and inefficient regimes by offering the
Venezuelan government with an easily-accessible alternative source of unconditional aid
and trade.

Overview of Sino-Latin American Cases
Each of these cases embodies a unique problem Chinese unconditional and trade
poses to developing Latin American countries. These problems include dumping cheap
Chinese imports, exploiting domestic producers, reverting to “undiversified” economies,
and supporting corrupt regimes, among many. The continuation of these problems in
Latin American countries counteracts the efforts of institutions such as the World Bank
and IMF. As the Financial Times states, Chinese aid is “little more than blank checks to
badly run states, assistance that would undermine the efforts of the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund.”206
Both Sino-Latin American relations and Sino-African relations focus on the
primary products sectors. As mentioned in Chapter 3, China’s interest in many African
nations is based on their abundance of natural resources. This is mirrored in many SinoLatin American relationships. In a study conducted by the Congressional Research
Service, this trend is once again reiterated. Out of the five Latin American countries with
“large reported Chinese loans, assistance, and related investment projects” (Venezuela,
Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Costa Rica), four of the countries’ main export to China was
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in the primary products sector.207 These main exports include oil, iron ore, and minerals,
among others (see Roett 2008 for detailed table).208 Concentration in natural resource
production risks “deindustrialization” for many Latin American countries. In the case of
many African nations, oftentimes this focus simply deters economic growth. However, in
developed Latin American countries such as Brazil, the growth of the primary products
sector at the cost of diversification forces the economy to revert to a pre-industrialization
state. Table 2 below, adopted from Lum (2009), explicitly lists Latin American countries’
primary exports to China.
TABLE 2*
LAC MAIN EXPORTS TO CHINA
Selected Latin American Countries with Large Reported PRC Aid and Trade, 2002-2007
Main Exports to China

Chinese Financed Projects

Oil

Oil and gas exploration and
production; transportation

Brazil

Iron ore, agricultural commodities,
oil

Infrastructure

Chile

Minerals, ores

Natural resources (copper)

Colombia

Iron, oil

Steel, oil exploration, mining

Costa Rica

Electrical machinery

Humanitarian, infrastructure

Venezuela

*Adopted from Table 8 in Thomas Lum, “China’s Assistance and Government-Sponsored Investment
Activities in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia,” Congressional Research Service, November 25,
2009, 14.
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On the other hand, contrary to most African nations, Latin American countries act
as seamless dumping grounds for China’s cheap manufactured goods. This magnifies the
problem of “deindustrialization” by worsening the damage to Latin American domestic
economies. Domestic manufacturers are unable to compete with cheap Chinese goods. In
extreme cases, businesses are forced to move their production elsewhere, thus eliminating
thousands of domestic jobs. In the absence of diverse economic opportunities, Latin
American countries are further forced to focus on growing the primary products sector.
This translates to a dangerous increase dependence on non-renewable sources such as oil,
copper, and other primary products. Table 3 below, adopted from the World Development
article, “The Impact of China on Latin America and the Caribbean” highlights trade
deficits and surpluses. The table includes deficit-ridden countries such as Mexico and
Colombia. These trade deficits are due to the fact that Mexico and Colombia act as
dumping grounds for Chinese goods. On the other hand, the table shows resource-rich
countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela boasting trade surpluses. Although these
may seem advantageous, as mentioned earlier, the concentration in primary product
exports causes “deindustrialization.”
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TABLE 3*
TRADE BALANCE OF LAC WITH CHINA
From Years 1995, 2000, and 2005 ($ million)
1995

2000

2005

Mexico

-137.5

-2944.6

-4496.0

Brazil

136.2

-17.2

4076.8

Chile

-123.5

-33.5

1847.1

Venezuela

-50.3

-320.7

64.1

Colombia

35.5

-219.8

-939.6

*Adopted from Table 4 in Rhys enkins, Enrique Dussel Peters, and Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, “The
Impact of China on Latin America and the Caribbean,” World Development 36.2 (2007): 247. Source:
IMF, Direction of trade statistics.

Altogether, China’s interest in Latin America has resulted in “interactions [that]
exhibit both cooperative and conflictive tendencies.”209 The positive impacts of Chinese
aid and trade in Latin America include increased trade revenues for resource-rich
countries as well as an influx in funding for a variety of infrastructure projects. However,
as demonstrated throughout this chapter, the negative consequences tend to outweigh the
beneficial. Chinese unconditional aid and trade with Latin America has created unstable
economies in countries that once boasted diversified markets. Even more, Chinese aid has
supported the perpetuation of corruption in countries such as Venezuela. The persistence
of corrupt regimes in countries with resource-dependent economies will undoubtedly
cause grave long-term effects. In conclusion, the intricacy of economic traps caused by
Chinese unconditional aid and trade is especially detrimental to Latin American countries
209

Hearn, China Engages Latin America, 181.

60

and will cause long-lasting consequences. These specific implications will be explored in
the following chapter.
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Chapter Five: Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America

In the preceding chapters we have reviewed Sino-African relations and introduced
a number of Sino-Latin American cases. The Sino-African cases act as mature examples
of Chinese unconditional aid and trade. As Sino-Latin American relations continue to
develop, we can infer long-term implications by comparing Latin American cases to
African cases. Specifically, I have identified stark similarities between Chinese aid and
trade in both regions. Chinese unconditional aid and trade in both regions supports
corrupt regimes and forces economies to focus solely on their primary products sectors.
On the other hand, we have uncovered an obvious difference in Sino-African and SinoLatin American trade. China is focused primarily on extracting natural resources from
African countries. On the other hand, in addition to primary products, China also uses
Latin American countries as a dumping ground for cheap Chinese manufactured goods.
In this final chapter, I will discuss the long-term implications of Chinese
unconditional aid and trade upon the future of Latin American countries. Will these SinoAfrican cases and contextual evidence allow us to hypothesize about the future trajectory
of Sino-Latin American relations? I argue that the Sino-African cases share enough
similarities with Chinese aid and trade in Latin America to hypothesize about a number
of future effects. However, I will also consider the differences between Sino-African and
Sino-Latin American relations, specifically in terms of trade, and account for these in my
concluding remarks.
A wide array of scholarship on the effects of Chinese unconditional aid and trade
in Africa already exists in modern literature (Brautigam 2009, van Dijk 2009, and Manji
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2007). However, there is a lack of substantial literature regarding the long-term
implications of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin America. Although scholars
such as Ellis (2009) and Hearn (2011) provide historical context and hypothesize about
future effects, there is very little additional contemporary literature to support their
claims. In fact, the majority of literature regarding Sino-Latin American aid and trade
comes in journalistic forms such as articles in The New York Times or The Economist.
There is simply a lack of in-depth analysis on the long-term implications of unconditional
Sino-Latin American aid and trade. Even more specifically, there is little comparative
analysis on Sino-African and Sino-Latin American relations. In order to fill this void, this
concluding chapter will provide two hypothesized trajectories. It is important to note that
the uniqueness of each Latin American case, as seen in previous chapters, makes it
difficult to assume one trajectory for all countries. In order to accommodate for this
uniqueness in Sino-Latin American relations, I will tailor each trajectory for specific
cases.
Let us first reconsider the examples of unconditional Sino-African aid and trade.
As explained in Chapter 3, the purpose of including these cases was to better understand
Chinese motivations, assess Chinese unconditional aid’s effectiveness, and provide
context in order to hypothesize about future implications of Sino-Latin American aid and
trade. Scholars such as Lum (2009), van Dijk (2009), and Manji (2007), among others,
provided helpful information on the cases of Sudan, Angola, and Zambia. First, the case
of Sudan exemplified China’s thirst for oil at the cost of egregious human rights
violations. Chinese unconditional aid and trade with Sudan perpetuates human rights
violations specifically in the Darfur region. Although China receives large amounts of oil
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from the country, the revenues support and legitimize a government that does little to
protect its citizens from wide-spread massacre. Second, the case of Angola demonstrated
the negative effects of large amounts of Chinese aid for impractical projects. Chinese aid
to construct extravagant satellite cities and other unreasonable projects leaves ghost
towns and unfinished work. The only ones benefitting from these empty investments are
the Chinese government and Chinese companies, not the Angolan people. Lastly, the case
of Zambia highlighted China’s disregard of safety concerns. This again leads to
detrimental long-term effects of Chinese-funded projects in the developing countries.
Although each of these three Sino-African cases offered a unique perspective, all of them
highlighted China’s interest in primary products. China’s focus on the primary products
sector has created countless negative long-term impacts on many African nations; as
explained above, these include violations of human rights, ineffective projects, deaths of
domestic workers, and impeding economic growth. We will use these tangible long-term
implications to hypothesize about the consequences of Sino-Latin American
unconditional aid and trade.
In order to use the Sino-African cases as comparative examples for the Sino-Latin
American cases, it is important to reassess similarities and differences. As demonstrated
in Chapter 4, each Latin American case presented (Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela)
highlighted different Chinese motivations and short-term effects. The case of Mexico was
unique to Latin America and did not share many similarities with the Sino-African cases.
Mexico is not a primary products exporter to China; rather, China exports cheap
manufactured goods to the developing Latin American market. Second, the case of Brazil
highlighted the daunting concept of “deindustrialization.” The case of Brazil resembles
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many Sino-African cases in that China is mostly interested in Brazilian natural resources.
However, it is important to consider scale; the Brazilian economy is notably more
developed than many African economies. Third, the case of Chile demonstrated the
instability that arises when a country’s economy is dependent on commodity prices.
China has cornered Chile into focusing primarily on copper production. Therefore,
Chile’s economy is extremely reliant on the world price of the primary product. Lastly,
the case of Venezuela was arguably the most similar to the Sino-African cases explored
earlier. The Venezuelan government, a notoriously corrupt institution, receives billions of
dollars of Chinese unconditional aid. In addition, China buys large amounts of
Venezuelan oil, creating revenues for the corrupt Venezuelan leaders. Receiving over
$800 billion in oil revenue from 2000 to 2012, the Venezuelan government was able to
boast social programs and pocket the remains.210 As mentioned in Chapter 4, in 2013,
five Venezuelan government officials were charged with stealing approximately $84
million from a Chinese development fund.211 Despite massive oil revenues from China, in
2013, a third of Venezuelans were still living in poverty, an increase of nearly a quarter
from the previous year.212 These acts of corruption and subsequent burdens on the
Venezuelan people are nothing new. This case mirrors many Sino-African relationships
such as the case of Sudan. Overall, each Sino-Latin American case shares a number of
similarities and differences with the Sino-African cases. Acknowledging these
similarities and differences will afford us with the opportunity to make informed
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hypotheses on the long-term implications of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin
America.
In the following section, I will introduce two distinct possible trajectories of the
Sino-Latin American relationship, An Optimistic View and Lessons from Africa. With an
increasing presence of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in the region, it is important
to thoughtfully consider each possibility.

An Optimistic View: Mutually Beneficial, Long-Term Growth
A number of scholars have hypothesized that China’s unconditional aid and trade
in Latin America may afford the developing region with long-term economic growth, a
strategic and policy role model, and a strong trading partner (Devlin 2007 and Toro
2013). With the rise in the world price of commodities in the early 2000s and an increase
in Chinese demand for such products, Latin America benefited not only from its sales to
China, but also to the rest of the world.213 After the 2008-09 global financial crisis, the
World Bank optimistically hypothesized that Latin America’s partnership with China
would support continued economic growth and activity.214 This section will focus on two
main arguments supporting this optimistic trajectory: China as a commodity importer and
China as an economic role model.
First, assuming that China’s growth is long-lasting and stable, scholars argue that
commodity prices will remain high.215 Although commodity prices may begin to plateau
over time, Latin American economies will not experience extreme unsettling dives in
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primary product values. In order to make up for the slight, but not detrimental, projected
losses in commodity income due to leveling prices, Latin American economies will need
to raise long-term growth via investment.216 China’s unconditional aid would
hypothetically provide the resources necessary to make investments for the Latin
American economies. Even more, contrary to the “resource curse” idea, the World Bank
argued in their Flagship Report, Natural Resources in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Beyond Booms and Busts, that there is “no compelling evidence that commodity
production is inherently or generally ‘inferior’ to other types of production in its ability to
generate linkages and spillovers.”217,218 The report argues that growth outcomes of
resource-rich countries are crucially dependent on the quality of institutions and policy
frameworks. Therefore, China is not inhibiting Latin American growth by investing in the
primary products sector. In fact, one could argue that China as a primary products
importer is helping sustain and grow Latin American economies. As Alejandro Werner,
leader of the Western hemisphere division at the IMF says, “from a medium termperspective, China is a plus, plus, plus for Latin America.”219
Second, as in the African cases, China bases many of its relationships on the idea
of mutual benefit. China claims its own struggle as a developing country allows the
superpower to relate to developing regions. At the Asia-Africa Business Forum in April
2005, Chinese President u intao claimed, “As a developing country itself, China takes
the strengthening of its friendship and cooperation with developing countries as the
216
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cornerstone of its foreign policy.”220 Even more, many developing countries, including
those in Latin America, view China as a model of economic success. As a role model for
developing countries, China is able to maintain positive relations with many developing
countries, including Latin America. The long-term implications of such a relationship
include deepened trust and cooperation. We have already seen this develop in cases such
as Brazil. When China was excluded from the World Trade Organization’s list of market
economy nations, Brazil, among other Latin American countries, recognized China’s
status in the market economy by signing a bilateral memorandum. This symbolic gesture
is only a glimpse into the possible diplomatic relations that may arise from the Sino-Latin
American relationship.
Proponents of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin America highlight
growing bilateral trade and China as a role model. In many ways, this view assesses the
short and medium term effects of Sino-Latin American relations. By assuming these short
and medium term trends continue, they assert that Sino-Latin American relations will
overcome the issues present in Sino-African relations.

Lessons from Africa: Short-Term Boom, Long-Term Bust
On the other hand, scholars argue that Chinese unconditional aid and trade cause
short-term booms in Latin American economies, but will not be able to sustain long-term
growth in the developing region. Even more, the use of unconditional aid and trade will
deter Latin American countries from reaching their economic potential by disallowing
economic diversification, preventing the promotion of human rights, and discouraging
220
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decent business practices. As Roett (2008) explains, time and time again that China has
adopted a “no-strings attached” approach in developing regions at the expense of sound
business practices, respect of human rights, and good governance.221
This section will seek to prove the rationale behind the statement, “It is clear that
significant trade and other links are, by themselves, no guarantee of high long-term
growth,” specifically in terms of the Sino-Latin American relationship.222 Using evidence
introduced in earlier chapters, I will argue that Chinese unconditional aid to Latin
America is propping up ineffective regimes in countries such as Venezuela, thus
preventing long-term progress. Further, I will also argue that Chinese trade with resourcerich Latin American countries does not provide nor allow sustainable long-term
economic growth. In order to prove these points, I will refer to examples of Chineseaided corruption in Latin America, the concept of “deindustrialization,” and the Solow
Growth Model. Lastly, I will analyze China’s growth in present-day and analyze the
effects on Latin American economies.
First, Chinese unconditional aid is fueling corrupt and ineffective regimes by
providing an attractive alternative to conditional IMF and U.S. foreign aid. The levels of
corruption vary throughout Latin America. Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay score
relatively high in governance reviews, unlike many other countries which score well
below the world median, such as Venezuela.223 The majority of this corruption is limited
to resource-rich countries, which “did not seize the opportunity for governance reform
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during the commodity supercycle.”224 Corrupt rulers, both in Latin America and Africa,
are able to avoid conditional aid by turning to China. Conditional aid from institutions
such as the IMF is often criticized by a number of Latin American countries. For
example, the Argentinian government openly blamed the IMF for its economic collapse
in 2001-02.225 In order to obtain more lenient forms of aid, Latin American leaders are
increasingly looking to China. The long-term implications of easy access to foreign aid
are especially precarious in corrupt countries such as Venezuela, among many. In part, by
using Chinese aid and oil revenues, Hugo Chávez was able to claim responsibility for
lowering poverty rates, increasing social spending, decreasing child malnutrition, and
increasing the number of Venezuelans receiving pensions.226 These benefits enchanted
many Venezuelans and blinded them from blatant acts of corruption, thus allowing
Chávez to remain in power for 14 years. This development mirrors the African cases of
corruption, such as Sudan, explained in Chapter 3. Today, Sudan is still plagued with
wide spread violence across the Darfur region, killing thousands of innocent civilians.
Similar to the African cases, Chinese unconditional aid will enable corrupt Latin
American governments to not only pocket resource revenues and aid, but also to boast
astonishing growth figures in order to remain in power.
Second, the fear of “deindustrialization” is arguably the most relevant for Latin
America as a whole. As Hearn (2011) explains, a concentration in commodities combined
with increased competition from China in domestic and third markets has sparked fears
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of “deindustrialization” in many Latin American countries, especially Brazil and Chile.227
As arvard development expert Dani Rodrik explains, “premature deindustrialization” is
the process in which developing countries shut off the standard path of economic
development followed by most countries since the industrial revolution.228 Alicia
Barcena, who leads the United ations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean said, “We’re not calling for more protectionism, but to substitute imports
within competitive open economies.”229 She suggests that China needs to invest in the
long-term growth of Latin American economies. “You want our commodities? Okay. But
also invest in solar panels here,” she said.230 By having only non-renewable primary
products to support domestic economies, many Latin American countries are destined for
short-term booms and long-term busts.
Lastly, let us return to the Solow Growth Model introduced in Chapter 2. There
are many ways countries can experience economic growth through forming relationships
with other countries. As Adams-Kane and Lim (2011) explain, a developing economy
can benefit from a growing superpower by absorbing the exports of the latter, in this case
China.231 However, economic theory maintains that a productivity-enhancing technology
is required to have substantial long-lasting growth. Chinese aid and trade in Latin
America is doing quite the opposite; both Chinese aid and trade are concentrated
primarily in the natural resources sector. This concentration in an undiversified sector
discourages innovative technology and productivity; instead it “deindustrializes” the
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country, as explained previously. Although this hypotheses may hold stronger in
countries such as Brazil and Chile, Chinese aid and trade’s inability to create long-term
growth is significant for the Latin American region as a whole.
Altogether, these negative long-term implications are magnified by China’s
current economic state. istorically, China’s voracious demand for primary products
raised the world price for many Latin American natural resources. For example, Chile
enthusiastically watched as China’s “once-insatiable” demand helped raise copper prices
from $1 to $4 per pound.232 owever, today China’s economy is slowing drastically.
Although the Chinese government recently cut interest rates and lowered the amount of
reserves banks are required to hold, scholars argue these actions will not be enough to
boost growth. In 2015, China cut its growth target to 7%, which would be the slowest
expansion goal in over two decades.233 This number proves that China’s growth is worse
than most scholars had expected. In fact, the IMF, among others, predicted that Chinese
annual growth would stay above 8% until at least 2017.234 Even more, as mentioned
during the introduction of the Solow Growth Model, long-term economic growth is a
function of changes in labor, capital, and productivity.235 Although China had an increase
in all three for many years, today they are all slowing. China’s working-age population
peaked in 2012, investment seems to have “topped out,” and China’s technological
advances have plateaued.236 As The Economist says, “Double-digit growth is most
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certainly a relic of China’s past.”237 The implications of China’s lagging growth are grave
for dependent Latin American economies. The drop in commodity prices is just an
indication of the larger consequences on the region. The long-term implications of
China’s slowing growth on Latin America include a drop in commodity prices, the loss of
a major trading partner, and the existence of economies unable to deal with either.

Conclusions
In this final chapter I have demonstrated that the Sino-Latin American
relationship will most likely follow one of two trajectories. Accounting for the SinoAfrican cases and the tangible long-term implications of Chinese unconditional aid and
trade, I am able to hypothesize about the future long-term implications of Chinese aid and
trade in Latin America. Oil-backed Chinese aid to Africa has propped up corrupt and
inefficient regimes that have perpetuated human rights abuses across many nations. I
similarly conclude that, in certain countries known for corruption such as Venezuela,
Chinese unconditional aid allows ineffective regimes to stay in power. As an attractive
alternative to stringent IMF or U.S. aid, Chinese aid is widely available to corrupt rulers
across Latin America. Although acts of corruption in Latin American countries such as
Venezuela may be less extreme as those in South Sudan, Chinese aid nevertheless blindly
fuels unethical rulers. These leaders are able to use revenues and aid not only for
themselves, but to also to boast attractive social spending projects, many of which are
faulty or never implemented. Even more, given the scholarly economic analyses, I
conclude that Chinese unconditional trade provides short-term booms based in primary
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products, but causes detrimental long-term busts. By focusing solely on their primary
products sector, Latin American countries are failing to diversify their economies and
protect themselves from dropping commodity prices. Given these findings, I conclude
that the second trajectory, Lessons from Africa, is the most probable.
While I have attempted to provide a comprehensive analysis on Chinese
unconditional aid and trade in Latin America, there is still considerable work to be done.
There exists a need for additional contemporary comparative analyses on the long-term
implications of Chinese unconditional aid and trade in Latin America. With an abundance
of available literature regarding Sino-African relations and its long-term effects, it is now
necessary to take these lessons and apply them to the Sino-Latin American cases. In
addition, analyses should be supported with economic facts and theories that may help
hypothesize about the future trajectory of Sino-Latin American relations, specifically in
terms of trade. It is necessary to fill these voids in research as China’s rise slows and
Latin American economies feel the burdening effects.
China will likely be a long-lasting ally of Latin America. Although at a lower rate,
it is probable that Chinese unconditional aid and trade will continue to have effects on
Latin American economies and governments. Analysis on the potential long-term
implications of such a relationship is warranted as Latin American economies continue to
emerge as important global players. The possibility for troublesome times in the future is
quite high, but dedication to economic diversification and upholding of good governance
may allow Latin American countries to escape the fate of many African nations.
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